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The Movement Control Order (MCO) not only restricts movement of human 
being, it also reduces firms’ financial profits and brings significant impact to stock 
returns. The objective of this study is to examine the relation between Malaysian 
stock market returns and variables related to the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
pandemic outbreak. The FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index and eight selected 
main indices from 2 January 2020 to April 30, 2020, which includes the first 
three MCOs, are considered in this study. The results show that daily new 
confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths had negative but insignificant impact on 
the returns on indices. Interestingly, MCO had significant and positive impact on 
all the indices’ returns while oversea financial risks had negative impact on these 
returns. Furthermore, it is found that the degree of impacts of MCO and oversea 
financial risks varied positively with the firm size of the indices’ constituent 
companies. China’s decision on unchanged loan prime rate on the 20 February 
2020 was a favorable news to the Malaysia stock markets as indicated by the 
positive returns on all the indices. Similarly, the degree of impact of the China 
interest policy also varied positively with the firms’ characteristics. These findings 
are useful for investors in the Bursa Malaysia to manage their investment 
portfolios based on their appetites for risk. 
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The novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic outbreak has created a social 
risk that has impacted the financial growth of firms and the economic 
growth of Malaysia. Malaysian economic growth has hit as 10-year low as 
fears loom about COVID-19. Malaysia’s economic growth has slowed from 
its rate of 4.3% in 2019, as The Central Bank of Malaysia has announced 
that the COVID-19 outbreak will affect Malaysia’s rate of economic growth 
for Q1 2020. Moreover, due in large part to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
World Bank has revised down Malaysia’s GDP growth rate from 4.5% to -
0.1% for 2020. The main sources for the economic damage in Malaysia 
come from both external and internal factors. First, Malaysia is expected 
to feel the knock-on effect of the impacts of the coronavirus abroad. 
Singapore and China, which are among Malaysia’s biggest trading partners, 
are also dealing with damage to their economies and industrial 
productivity from the COVID-19 outbreak. Any disruption to the industrial 
productivity of China could have a grave impact on domestic 
manufacturers in Malaysia, which are dependent on Chinese raw materials. 
Apart from trade, China is also Malaysia’s top source of tourists, exceeding 
that of the ASEAN group. Travel, tourism, and related sectors such as 
hotels and other accommodations are expected to be among the most 
affected sectors in Malaysia due to the travel band on China tourists.  
 
Second, the economic slowdown is also due to domestic factors such as the 
movement control measures put in place because of COVID-19. On a macro 
level, the closure of businesses and services, as well as the impacts on travel 
and the controls put over movement, will have outsized impacts on the 
levels of domestic consumption and business investment. Individuals and 
businesses affected by the temporary closures, especially small-and-
medium enterprises (SMEs) and other vulnerable groups, will face a 
liquidity squeeze in terms of their cash flow as their earnings dwindle. This 
could leave the entire economy with higher levels of businesses insolvency 
and individual bankruptcies, while the financial system as a whole will be 
saddled with non-performing loans. 
 
Malaysia joined the list of countries with the coronavirus when the first 
case of infection was confirmed for a Wuhan tourist on January 25, 2020. 
The total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases surged to 428 cases on 
March 15, 2020, when there were 190 cases that were detected in that 
single day alone (a daily increment of 73.9%). The Malaysian government 
announced a nation-wide lock-down that started as of March 18, 2020, to 
control the spread of this infectious disease. Under the so-called Movement 
Control Order (MCO), all private and government offices, business 
premises, and places of worship, except those of these that were considered 
essential services, were closed. Soon after the implementation of the MCO, 
the number of daily confirmed new cases peaked on March 16, with 235 
cases, and the number of cases per day started to decline gradually after 
that. The MCO was extended trice until May 3, 2020. The Conditional MCO 
(CMCO) was implemented the next day and was put in force until June 9, 
2020. The CMCO allows for the majority of businesses to operate, though 
only if certain precautionary steps were strictly observed. As of May 13, 
2020, there were altogether 6,779 confirmed COVID-19 cases, 5,281 cases 
of those who had recovered from the coronavirus (77.9%), and 111 deaths 
from the coronavirus (1.64%). 
 
Many negative thoughts and panic come to the minds of investors 
whenever this global, dangerous infectious disease is mentioned. The 
Malaysian stock market has also taken a hit from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
As of March 27, 2020, the Bursa had sunk to its lowest numbers in a decade, 
having fallen 20.52% since the start of the year. Airlines stocks were among 
some of the most battered stocks this year, and other blue chip stocks in 
banking and consumer goods were not spared. There were a few who 
gained, however, from the COVID-19 outbreak, including healthcare stocks 
and, especially, manufacturers of gloves.  
 
  
Numerous empirical studies had provided evidences that Malaysian stock 
returns are effected by investor sentiments (Chia, 2019). To the best of our 
knowledge, the relation between Malaysian stock returns and investor 
sentiments that are driven by a fear of dangerous infectious diseases has 
not been investigated, except by Ali, Alam and Rizvi (2010). Ali et al. (2010) 
found in the Malaysian stock market evidence of a short-run stock market 
overreaction to dramatic internal and external events. Besides the 
economic crisis and the extraordinary political events that occurred in 
Malaysia, the Malaysian stock markets also overreacted to the dramatic 
international events caused by the SARS outbreak.  
 
In a similar spirit of studying the impact of an infectious disease on stock 
market returns, this study focusses on the impact of the novel Coronavirus, 
that is, COVID-19, outbreak on Malaysian stock market returns. As of this 
writing, nearly 300,000 individuals have died from COVID-19 worldwide. 
This disease outbreak has been a large event that has been devastating to 
the economies and societies of more than 180 countries. It should also be 
recalled that the death tolls from SARS and MERS were each less than 
1,000 worldwide for each and, therefore, for many countries, the SARS and 
MERS outbreaks did not become serious threats to their economies.  
 
Specifically, our main contribution consists of employing a novel mood 
variable, namely, a proxy for the number of COVID-19 cases released by 
the Ministry of Health Malaysia, to examine the impact of dangerous 
infectious diseases on Malaysian stock indexes. Beutels et al. (2009) found 
a significant correlation in Beijing between the time series of daily and 
monthly SARS cases and deaths and the indicators of social and economic 
activity during the SARS outbreak. Our study researches investor fear of 
the COVID-19 pandemic as it is captured by an investment fear index, 
which is a proxy for the financial markets volatility index (VIX). A study by 
Albulescu (2020) confirmed that the new cases of COVID-19 and the rates 
of death reported outside China had a positive impact on the VIX, and that 
the spread of the coronavirus increased the levels of financial volatility.  
 
Important in this research is the possibility that a fear of dangerous 
infectious diseases can bring about negative developments to the main 
indices of the Malaysian stock market, but, at the same time, this may 
generate positive investor sentiments or positive returns in specific market 
capitalization’s main indices. This hypothesis is built on the argument that 
while dangerous infectious diseases spread fear and generate negative 
sentiments, investors may anticipate that there will be improvements in 
the performance of certain categories of firms that are listed in Bursa 
Malaysia, namely those for essential goods, services, and subsidies 
provided for fighting the disease. Related to this, the current study shows 
that the MCO had a significant and positive impact on the returns of all 
indices, and that this is probably due to positive market sentiments about 
the government efforts to control the outbreak of COVID-19, which came 
with a series of stimulus packages to help the needy and to stimulate the 
country’s economic activities in the midst of the lockdown. Nevertheless, 
the number of daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths had a 
negative but insignificant impact on these returns. Moreover, overseas 
financial risks arising from COVID-19-related sentiments had a negative 
impact on these returns, while China’s favorable interest rate policy 
positively impacted these returns.  
There are three key contributions of this study. First, while the Movement 
Control Order is expected to weaken economic performance and to cause 
a negative stock market performance, this study postulates that it may 
result in positive investor sentiments, especially when there are 
government stimulus packages put in place, as is the case for Malaysia. The 
empirical evidence obtained in this study supports this argument. Second, 
this study is among the first to add to the literature on the Malaysia stock 
market concerning the impact of the novel coronavirus. It reveals the 
behaviour of Malaysia stock market during the time of the global pandemic 
crisis. Third, it demonstrates that the degree of impact of the MCO, global 
financial risks, and the Chinese interest rate policy varied with the listed 
companies’ level of capitalization. Thus, investors in the Bursa Malaysia 
  
can take these findings as information that will help them manage their 
investment portfolios in terms of their appetites for risk.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
literature review for studies related to infectious diseases and their effects 
on the performance of different stock markets. Section 3 describes the data 
obtained, and it contains a preliminary analysis of the results. Section 4 
explains the study’s methodology while the results of the estimation are 
given in Section 5. The last section concludes this study. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Past studies by Keogh-Brown and Smith (2020) and Beutels et al. (2009) 
had statistically estimated the economic impact of the infectious disease 
outbreaks of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). SARS was 
first reported in Asia in February 2003, and it quickly spread to 26 
countries before being contained about four months later. Beutels et al. 
(2009) employed cross-correlation functions to document the impact of 
the SARS outbreak on Beijing using indicators of social and economic 
activity. Significant correlation coefficients were found for leisure activities, 
local and international transport, and tourism given that much of this 
consumption was postponed or cancelled. Keogh-Brown and Smith (2008) 
conducted a retrospective estimation that used macroeconomic indicators 
for ascertaining the effects on different countries. China and Hong Kong 
were reported to be the worst affected areas when compared to East Asia 
and Canada. The sectors that exhibited the greatest amount of losses due 
to SARS were those in investment, retail sales, restaurants, hotels, tourism, 
and air transport. 
 
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) is respiratory disease, one 
that is also caused by a coronavirus. The 2015 MERS outbreak in the 
Republic of Korea resulted in 38 deaths and more than 16,000 people were 
quarantined by December 2015. Joo et al. (2019) estimated the economic 
impact in the Republic of Korea of the MERS outbreak on the tourism and 
travel-related service sectors. From their projection, Joo et al. (2019) found 
that the MERS outbreak caused a 37.4% decrease in the number of 
noncitizen visitors (2.1 million out of the 5.7 million non-citizen arrivals 
that were projected) from June through September, 2015, with an 
estimated loss of US$2.6 billion in the tourism sector. These results show 
that outbreaks of infectious diseases can cause significant losses to the 
economies of affected countries.  
 
An infectious disease poses a number of economic and social risks, and this 
is reflected in stock market performance. However, there is a dearth of 
research on the stock market performance during the periods when there 
is an infectious diseases outbreak (Ali et al., 2010; Donadelli, Kizys, & 
Riedel, 2017; Jiang et al., 2017). The study by Jiang et al. (2017) found a 
significant correlation between the number of daily reported human avian 
influenza A (H7N9) cases and the stock price of the Shanghai Composite 
Index. The number of cases was also found to be associated with the prices 
of the Avian Influenza sector index as well as the prices of a few Chinese 
pharmaceutical stocks. In the United States, Donadelli et al. (2017) had 
shown that the investor mood is driven by disease-related news concerning 
the outbreak of infectious diseases (e.g., SARS, Influenza A (H1N1), polio, 
and Ebola). Specifically, this disease-related news had the effect of leading 
to a positive and significant sentiment among investors in pharmaceutical 
companies’ stocks. 
 
Learning from the previous SARS and MERS epidemic experiences, soon 
after the outbreak of the COVID-19, researchers have started proactive 
crisis response on the most affected countries. The paper of Zimmermann 
et al. (2020) provided an initial understanding of the driving factors for the 
spread of the COVID-19 infection. Globalization, a major force behind 
global wellbeing and equality, is found to be highly associated with the 
spread of the virus. Moreover, globalization has been indicated as a factor 
that facilities the spread of this infectious disease, it can have an impact on 
many different channels including international trade, international 
  
tourism, and transportation. Consequently, it is anticipated that the 
COVID-19 pandemic can pose a longer-term economic threat to those 
infected countries and lead to a severe global economic crisis.     
 
In view of this, preliminary studies have been conducted on the financial 
market to reveal the impact of the COVID-19. As such, the studies of Nia 
(2020), Ali, Alam and Rizvi (2020), Liu, A. Manzoor, Wang, Zhang and Z. 
Manzoor (2020) and Sharif, Aloui and Yarovaya (2020) found evidence 
that the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected the equity market. In 
particular, focusing on the Indonesian capital market during the COVID-
19 outbreak, Nia (2020) found that the market return, market 
capitalization and book to market value ratio mutually affected the 
portfolio expected return. Nia (2020) also recommended that banking and 
consumer sectors can be an alternative portfolio for long-term investment 
in Indonesian stock market. Interestingly, Ali et al. (2020) reported that 
panic in the global financial markets increased as the COVID-19 evolved 
from epidemic to pandemic. Liu et al. (2020) also mentioned that Asian 
stock market tended to react faster and able to recover from pandemic 
impact at the later stage. In the time of writing this paper, while China and 
the Asian market has stabilised, market volatility increased tremendously 
at the bigger economies such as the US, UK and Germany in the later phase 
of the spread. Importantly, Sharif et al. (2020) pointed out that the COVID-
19 risk is perceived differently over the short and the long-run and it may 
turn into an economic crisis and this prompted urgent attention of 
policymakers and asset managers.  
 
Besides the equity markets, cryptocurrencies also become the focus of 
researches in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. By using Wavelet 
coherence analysis, Demir, Bilgin, Karabulut and Doker (2020) found a 
negative relationship between Bitcoin price and the number of reported 
cases and deaths. The findings for Ethereum and Ripple were also similar 
but with weaker interactions. Demir et al. (2020) argued that the hedging 
role of cryptocurrencies against the uncertainty has been raised by the 
COVID-19 during the period of this pandemic outbreak. 
 
 
3. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
 
3.1.  Variables and the Sources of Data 
 
This study examines the daily closing values of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
KLCI Index (denoted as KLCI) and eight selected main indices. The latter 
are the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index (T100), FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
Mid 70 Index (M70), Small Cap Index (SC), EMAS Index (EMAS), EMAS 
Shariah Index (ESH), Hijrah Shariah Index (HSH), ACE Index (ACE), and 
Fledgling Index (FLED).  
 
Briefly, the KLCI and M70 constitute the largest 30 and the next 70 largest 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board in terms of their full 
market capitalisation that meets the eligibility requirements relating to 
free float and liquidity. T100 is comprised of the constituents of KLCI and 
M70, while the SC is comprised of those eligible companies within the top 
98% of the Bursa Malaysia Main Market that are non-T100. The EMAS is 
constituted of companies included in the T100 and SC. The ESH and HSH 
are comprised of companies included in the EMAS and KLCI, respectively, 
that are Shariah-compliant (which requires another screening process) 
and are investable in terms of Shariah principles. By contrast, the FLED is 
comprised of those eligible companies in the Bursa Malaysia Main Market 
that are not constituents of the EMAS, whereas the ACE is comprised of all 
eligible companies, and normally it is start-ups and new companies that 
are listed on the ACE market, which has less stringent requirements. Note 
that the companies listed in FLED and ACE do not have to go through a 
liquidity screening process (Bursa Malaysia, 2020).  
 
The full sample period covers the period from January 2, 2020, to April 30, 
2020. Note also that the Movement Control Order (MCO) was 
implemented in Malaysia as of March 18, 2020, and it was in force for the 
last day of this sample period (Bunyan, March 16, 2020; Bernama, April 
  
23, 2020). The data for the stock indices data was obtained from 
Investing.com. The data for the daily new confirmed COVID-19 cases and 
deaths was collected from Worldometers.com.  
 
The daily percentage return on an index can be calculated as: 
  
 𝑅𝑡 =  (𝐼𝑡−𝐼𝑡−1)𝐼𝑡−1 ×100%,       (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡  is the return on the market index at day 𝑡, whereas 𝐼𝑡  and 𝐼𝑡−1 
stand for the closing prices of index at day 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 1, respectively. 
 
3.2.  The Behaviour of Returns on Indices 
 
The plots of the daily percentage returns on these indices are presented in 
Figure 1. It is apparent from Figure 1 that, overall, the returns were 
fluctuating around the zero level. However, a number of substantial large 
market corrections were observed from around the last trading week of 
February until mid-March 2020. This occurred in collaboration with a 
series of global deep market corrections during this period due to growing 
fears about the economic impact of the pandemic. This set of stock market 
plunges was referred to as the 2020 global stock market crash by financial 
news (see, e.g., Smith, February 28, 2020 and Williams, March 10, 2020). 
On the other hand, there was an obvious massive amount of positive daily 
returns for all indices March 20, 2020, as a result of the positive market 
sentiment in Asia arising from China keeping its loan prime rate 
unchanged (Huang, 2020). Remarkably, the returns on all of the indices 
were more on the negative side, especially during the one month period 
before the MCO implementation. By contrast, the returns were more 






3.3.  The Returns on Indices and A Firm’s Characteristics 
 
The incidences of the minimum and maximum daily percentage returns on 
the indices for the full sample period are summarised in Table 1. Table 1 
shows that the Malaysia indices registered for the largest daily loss in the 
range of 4.897% and 10.641% on March 13 and 16. Meanwhile, they 
recorded the largest amount of daily profits in the range of 5.876% and 
9.370% on March 20, 2020.  
 
Remarkably, Table 1 reveals three important facts that can be observed 
from the sample data set for the period from the outbreak of the COVID-
19 pandemic. First, the returns on the indices depend on the capitalisation 
of their constituent companies. In particular, the larger (smaller) the 
capital size of the constituent companies, the less (more) was the index’s 
maximum daily loss in a time of an unfavourable market sentiment, while 
the less (more) was the index’s maximum daily profit in a time of 
favourable market sentiment. The KLCI, comprised of the top 30 
companies in terms of capitalisation, had less of a maximum amount of 
loss (-5.261%) when compared to the M70 (-8.233%), which consists of the 
next 70 largest companies. The M70, in turn, recorded a smaller level of 
loss when compared to the SC (-10.641%), which is comprised of 
companies that have a smaller capital size, when compared to the KLCI and 
M70. Actually, the SC suffered the second-largest single-day loss after the 
ACE (-11.888%), when compared to all of the other indices. On the other 
hand, the SC managed to register the second-largest single-day profit 
(9.370%) after the ACE (9.982%), when compared to all of the other 
indices. Moreover, the M70 (7.548%) performed better than the KLCI 
(6.851%). These findings suggest that the companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia with a smaller capital size are more susceptible to a higher 
amount of single-day losses during a bad period, but also that they have a 




Second, the Shariah indices sustained less single-day losses than their 
counterparts in the bad markets. However, their counterparts performed 
better in the good markets. In this case, the ESH had a smaller single-day 
loss (-5.195%), when compared to the EMAS (-5.758%), whereas the EMAS 
had a higher single-day level of profit (7.084%) than the ESH (5.961%). 
Similarly, the HSH sustained a smaller amount of loss (-4.897%) than the 
KLCI (-5.261%), but the KLCI attained a larger amount of profit (6.851%) 
than the HSH (6.123%). Third, the ACE made more in terms of a single-
day loss (-11.888%) than the EMAS (-5.758%), but nevertheless it secured 





















    
             
      
Figure 1: Plots of daily percentage returns on indices 
 
Notes: KLCI: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index, T100: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index, M70: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 70 Index, SC: Small Cap Index, 
EMAS: EMAS Index, ESH: EMAS Shariah Index, HSH: Hijrah Shariah Index, ACE: ACE Index, and FLED: Fledgling Index. The shaded region shows the 
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Table 1: Minimum and maximum daily percentage returns on indices 
(full sample) 
Daily 
Return KLCI T100 M70 SC 
EMA
S ESH HSH ACE FLED 
Minimum -5.261 -5.537 -8.233 
-






















Rank 7 6 4 2 5 8 9 1 3 




















Rank 6 5 3 2 4 8 7 1 9 
Notes: KLCI: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index, T100: FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia Top 100 Index, M70: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 70 Index, SC: 
Small Cap Index, EMAS: EMAS Index, ESH: EMAS Shariah Index, HSH: 
Hijrah Shariah Index, ACE: ACE Index, and FLED: Fledgling Index. For 
negative returns, minimum implies maximum losses. Rank stands for the 
position of the index counting in the descending order of the magnitude of 
the returns. 
 
3.4.  Returns on indices and Movement Control Order 
 
The mean and standard deviations of the daily percentage returns on the 









Table 2: The mean and standard deviation of the daily percentage 



















Mean          
Full Sample -0.130 -0.149 -0.209 -0.248 -0.154 -0.096 -0.065 -0.051 -0.223 
Rank 4 5 7 9 6 3 2 1 8 
Before MCO -0.433 -0.484 -0.653 -0.869 -0.501 -0.449 -0.387 -0.655 -0.661 
Rank 8 6 4 1 5 7 9 3 2 
During MCO 0.371 0.405 0.528 0.781 0.420 0.488 0.469 0.951 0.502 
Rank 9 8 3 2 7 5 6 1 4 
Standard deviation       
Full Sample 1.563 1.666 2.168 2.896 1.713 1.602 1.504 3.182 2.050 
Rank 2 4 7 8 5 3 1 9 6 
Before MCO 1.313 1.412 1.856 2.362 1.455 1.415 1.290 2.580 1.827 
Rank 2 3 7 8 5 4 1 9 6 
During MCO 1.819 1.915 2.462 3.410 1.962 1.740 1.693 3.822 2.217 
Rank 3 4 7 8 5 2 1 9 6 
Notes: KLCI: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index, T100: FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia Top 100 Index, M70: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Mid 70 Index, SC: 
Small Cap Index, EMAS: EMAS Index, ESH: EMAS Shariah Index, HSH: 
Hijrah Shariah Index, ACE: ACE Index, and FLED: Fledgling Index. Rank 
stands for the position of the index counting in the descending order of the 
magnitude of the returns. 
 
Table 2 shows that the average returns on the indices were all negative 
regardless of a firm’s characteristics for the full sample period as well as for 
the sub-sample for the period before the MCO. However, the average 
negative returns for the sub-sample period before the MCO is larger in 
magnitude than the full sample. By contrast, all of the returns were positive 
for the during the MCO sub-sample. Note that the average daily profits 
during the MCO sub-period had smaller magnitude when compared to the 
average daily losses for before the MCO sub-period, with the exceptions of 
the ESH, HSH, and ACE. On the other hand, the standard deviations of the 
daily returns were consistently larger during the MCO sub-period, when 
compared to before, for all of the indices. Since the standard deviations are 
taken as a measurement for market risk, the finding suggests that the 
market risk was larger during the MCO period when compared to before.  
  
 
3.5 The Returns of the Indices and Market Risks 
 
To examine whether or not the market risks and returns are associated, the 
scatter plots of the average daily returns against the standard deviations 
are given in Figure 3. For a formal test, Kendall’s tau-b correlation analysis 
was conducted, and the results are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: The average daily returns against standard deviations 

















































































Table 3: The correlation analysis between the mean and standard 
deviations 










-0.444c 0.095 -0.857a 0.003 
Before 
MCO 
-0.778a 0.004 -0.857a 0.003 
During 
MCO 
0.667b 0.012 N.A. N.A. 
Note: The null hypothesis of correlation analysis is that means and 
standard deviations are not correlated. Rejection of null hypothesis implies 
the pair are significantly correlated. See note to Figure 2 for outliers to be 
excluded. N.A. denotes not applicable. Superscripts a, b and c stand for 
rejection of null hypothesis at 1,5 and 10% respectively.   
 
It is apparent from Figure 3 that in the case of the Bursa Malaysia indices, 
the market risk and returns were correlated during the full and sub-sample 
periods of this study. For the full sample period and the period before the 
MCO, negative correlations were observed in the fourth quadrant of the x-
y plot. This implies that the indices with higher (lower) risks were 
associated with larger (smaller) losses. On the other hand, during the MCO 
period, the indices with higher (lower) risks were associated with larger 
(smaller) returns. Table 3 confirms these observations by establishing 
significant correlations between the returns and the standard deviations. 
Nonetheless, the strength of the correlation is reduced from strong before 




                                                          
1 According to Mason, Lind and Marchal (1983), a correlation coefficient greater than 0.68 in magnitude is to be considered as 
strong in terms of the strength of the correlation. 
  
 
The following model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
technique: 
 
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐿𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝐷𝑀20𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡,
  (2) 
 
where 𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑡  is the confirmed new cases of COVID-19 at day 𝑡, 𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑡 is a 
dummy variable that takes on value of one during Movement Control 
Order (MCO) period and zero otherwise, 𝐿𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is used to proxy the 
investment fear sentiment outside Malaysia, 𝑅𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent 
variable, 𝐷𝑀20𝑡 is the dummy variable which is equal to one on March 20, 
2020, and zero on other days. 𝜃′𝑠 are the parameters to be estimated, and 𝜖𝑡 is the white noise residuals.2  
 
It is expected that the greater the amount of the daily confirmed new 
COVID-19, the more negative would be the market sentiment as a result of 
fear. This would in turn cause negative returns on the indices. Hence, 𝜃1 < 
0 is expected. The MCO not only restricted the movement of human beings 
to reduce the scope of COVID-19 outbreak, it also reduced the level of 
economic activities. Hence, the MCO was anticipated to bring about a 
negative impact on the returns on the indices by reducing firms’ financial 
profits. Next, 𝜃3 < 0 is anticipated, since the higher amount of financial 
volatility outside of Malaysia should negatively affect the Malaysia stock 
market and vice versa, due to its interconnectedness with global stock 
markets. As for lagged dependent variable, 𝜃4 < 0 implies an adjustment 
towards equilibrium, while 𝜃4  > 0 implies a persistence in deviations. 
Finally, 𝜃5 > 0 is expected from preliminary data analysis.  
 
In Equation (2), 𝜃0  denotes the expected returns in the absence of 
independent variables. Notably, the estimated value of 𝑅𝑡 for the trading 
days without the MCO and D20 can be derived as follows: 
                                                          
2 The residuals of the estimated models without 𝐷𝑀20𝑡 are not normally distributed. So, another purpose of the inclusion of this 
dummy is to normalize the residuals.  
 
 ?̂?𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐿𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑅𝑡−1,    (3) 
 
where ?̂?𝑡 denotes the estimated value of 𝑅𝑡 and 𝜃′𝑠 are estimated 𝜃′𝑠.  
 
On the other hand, the estimated value of 𝑅𝑡 during the MCO without D20 
can be calculated as: 






5. OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
The estimated results are summarized in Table 4. The key findings are 
given below. 
  
5.1.  The Impact of Daily New Confirmed COVID-19 Cases 
 
First and foremost, the coefficient of the DCC has the correct negative sign 
for all cases. In terms of magnitude, these were minute. Specifically, for 
each additional newly confirmed case, the returns on the indices will fall 
by 0.003% to 0.005%. Nevertheless, the impact is statistically significant 
for all indices, with the exception of the SC, ACE, and FLED.  
 
5.2.  The Impact of the Movement Control Order (MCO) 
 
The MCO had a positive impact on all returns for the indices, and the 
impact was statistically significant at a 1% level in all cases. Note that these 
indices had been falling in reaction to the global occurrence of the 
pandemic outbreak before the implementation of the Movement Control 
Order. The positive impact probably was due to the positive market 
  
sentiment that came from the government’s effort to control for the 
outbreak of COVID-19; this came with a series of stimulus packages to help 
the needy and to stimulate the country’s economic activities in the midst of 
the lockdown. In particular, the heavyweight Second Economic Stimulus 
Package 2020 (Crowe, March 28, 2020), worth 250-billion-ringgit, was 
announced on March 28, 2020, in addition to the First Economic Stimulus 
Package 2020, worth 10-billion-ringgit, that was announced on February 
28, 2020 (Crowe, February 28, 2020). Furthermore, on April 7, 2020, the 
Additional Prihatin SME Economic Stimulus Package 2020, worth 20-
billion-ringgit, was announced (Crowe, April 7, 2020).  
 
Second, it can be observed that the MCO had a greater impact on the SC 
(4.379%) than the M70 (3.132%), which in turn had received higher 
amount of impact from the MCO than the KLCI (2.000%, the least impact 
of all. Meanwhile, the MCO also had a greater impact on the ACE (4.666%) 
than the EMAS (2.358%) and other indices. These findings suggest that the 
degree of impact of the MCO on indices’ returns varies with the 
characteristics of the indices’ constituent companies. Specifically, the 
smaller the companies’ capital size, the more benefit they would receive 
from the MCO and vice versa. Besides, from the estimated coefficient of the 
MCO for T100 (2.260%) and the EMAS (2.254%), when compared to the 
same coefficient for the respective counter indices that are for non-Shariah 
compliant companies (2.254% for the ESH and 2.007% for the HSH), it 
can be concluded that the MCO had a slightly higher level of impact on the 
non-Shariah companies.  
 
5.3.  The Impact of the Overseas Financial Market Risk 
 
As expected, LVIX had a significant and negative impact on the returns on 
the indices consistently with no exceptions. Similar to the degree of the 
MCO impact, the impact of LVIX varied with the characteristics of the 
indices’ constituent companies. In particular, companies with a smaller 
capital size were more adversely affected by investors’ sentiments about 
the overseas financial risks. Nevertheless, non-Shariah companies were 




5.4.  The Impact of the Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Results 
Variable KLCI T100 M70 SC EMAS ESH HSH ACE FLED 
Constant 2.949b 3.378c 4.759c 8.401c 3.619c 3.086c 2.476b 9.861c 5.578c 
 [0.014] [0.009] [0.008] [0.001] [0.006] [0.010] [0.021] [0.000] [0.000] 
DCC -0.003a -0.004a -0.005a -0.004 -0.004a -0.004a -0.003b -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.084] [0.081] [0.081] [0.285] [0.090] [0.063] [0.043] [0.368] [0.250] 
MCO 2.000c 2.260c 3.132c 4.379c 2.358c 2.254c 2.007c 4.666c 3.134c 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LVIX -1.092c -1.246c -1.741c -2.994c -1.330c -1.150c -0.935c -3.431c -2.034c 
 [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] 
R(-1) -0.058 -0.043 -0.003 -0.044 -0.045 -0.048 -0.085 -0.078 -0.004 
 [0.634] [0.735] [0.982] [0.711] [0.726] [0.678] [0.437] [0.483] [0.975] 
DM20 6.832c 6.974c 7.635c 9.406c 7.066c 5.819c 5.924c 9.782c 6.109c 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Key Statistics         
n 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.405 0.410 0.376 0.388 0.410 0.359 0.363 0.364 0.386 
AIC 3.477 3.605 4.199 4.751 3.661 3.608 3.472 4.966 4.044 
F 10.261c 10.436c 9.203c 9.638c 10.451c 8.627c 8.758c 8.772 c 9.554c 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
JB 1.376 0.833 1.292 0.555 0.684 1.604 1.643 0.760 4.093 
 [0.502] [0.659] [0.524] [0.758] [0.710] [0.448] [0.440] [0.687] [0.129] 
Q(5) 3.023 3.991 4.620 5.820 3.905 4.391 5.300 3.084 4.816 
 [0.696] [0.551] [0.464] [0.324] [0.563] [0.495] [0.380] [0.684] [0.439] 
ARCH 0.358 1.360 2.471 4.893b 1.603 0.134 0.279 0.315 2.448 
  [0.552] [0.248] [0.121] [0.030] [0.210] [0.718] [0.599] [0.578] [0.122] 
Notes: See Equation (2) for symbols of variables used. AIC refers to the Akaike Information Criterion, while F stands for F- test of overall significant of the independent variables.  
JB, Q(5) and ARCH denote Jarque-Bera normality test statistic, correlogram statistic to test for autocorrelation up to lag 5 and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
test statistic, respectively. The p-values of various tests are in square brackets.  HAC standard errors & covariance are used in the estimation of the model. Superscripts a, b and 




The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable has a negative 
sign for all of the returns on the indices. This implies that the deviations of 
returns would not persist and that they tend to revert to the equilibrium 
positions. However, this mean-reverting behaviour was not statistically 
significant. This means that current returns were not affected by previous 
returns in all cases. 
 
5.5.  The Impact of the News on the Interest Rate Policy in 
China 
 
On March 20, 2020, China made an announcement on its decision to keep 
its loan prime rate unchanged. This was treated as favourable news as 
stocks in Asia (including those in Malaysia) surged substantially that the 
same day. The impact on the returns of each individual index can be 
measured by the estimated coefficient of the DM20 dummy variable. It can 
be seen from Table 1 that the impact was significant and positive at the 1% 
significance level for all returns on the indices. In line with the impacts of 
the MCO and LVIX, the impact of China’s interest rate policy also 
depended on the firms’ characteristics. In this case, the smaller the firms’ 
capital sizes, the larger was the impact and vice versa. This is evident from 
the SC, where the returns surged by 9.406% due to the news of March 20, 
2020, when compared to the M70 (7.635%) and the KLCI (6.832%). 
Moreover, the returns of the ACE surged the most of all (9.782%), while 
the return of the EMAS rose by 7.066%. These findings reveal that the 
companies with smaller capital sizes benefited more from the favourable 
news and vice versa. On the other hand, the favourable news from China 
had more of an impact on non-Shariah-compliant companies when 
compared to their Shariah-compliant counterparts. This is demonstrated 
by the amount of returns on their indices: the T100 (6.974%) and the 
EMAS (7.066%) in comparison to their Shariah complaint counter indices, 
the HSH (5.924%) and the ESH (5.819%), respectively. Note that the 
estimated impact on the returns of all of the indices differs slightly with the 
actual observations, as shown in Table 1.  
 
5.6.  The Impact of the Number of Daily Deaths Due to COVID-
19 
 
Apart from the number of daily newly confirmed cases, another important 
piece of information released by Ministry of Health every day is the amount 
of daily deaths due to COVID-19. To measure the impact of the number of 
daily deaths reported, Equation (2) is estimated with the daily new 
confirmed cases variable replaced by the number of daily deaths. The 
results obtained (not reported here) show that the amount of daily deaths 
had a negative but insignificant impact on the returns on all of the indices. 
Other than that, the previous mentioned findings from the daily newly 
confirmed cases remains consistent in terms of quality.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak has drastically reduced 
economy activities and has changed the norms related to social lifestyles. 
The Movement Control Order (MCO) not only restricted the movement of 
human beings, it also reduced firms’ financial profits and brought about a 
negative impact on stock returns. This study examines the impact of the 
Movement Control Order, issued in light of the COVID-19 pandemic 
outbreak, on the Bursa Malaysia benchmark indices. A few key findings are 
obtained. First, while the amount of daily deaths had no significant impact, 
the number of daily new COVID-19 cases had a significant, although 
minimal, impact on the returns on the indices. Second, the returns on the 
indices depend on the characteristics of the constituent companies. In 
particular, the larger (smaller) the capital size of the constituent companies, 
the less (more) was the amount of the index’s maximum daily loss in a time 
of unfavourable market sentiment and the less (more) was the index’s 
maximum daily profit in a time of favourable market sentiment.  
 
Third, the Shariah indices sustained less in terms of single-day losses than 
their conventional indices in bad markets. However, the latter performed 
  
better in good markets. Fourth, the average returns on the indices were all 
negative regardless of a firm’s characteristics before the MCO. However, 
they turned positive for the sub-sample from the period during the MCO, 
although the indices did not manage to recover their losses before the MCO. 
On the other hand, the market risk was larger during the MCO period when 
compared to before. Last but not least, the MCO had a significant and 
positive impact on all returns on the indices. This is probably due to the 
positive market reaction to the government’s commitment to contain 
COVID-19, as well as the social aid and economic stimulus packages put in 
place during the lockdown. These findings are useful for investors in the 
Bursa Malaysia to manage their investment portfolios based on their 
appetites for risk.  
 
Last but not least, two future directions are recommended here. First, this 
study does not consider the possibility of stock market anomalies. Further 
study could look into this to examine if any anomaly exists for the Bursa 
Malaysia. Second, the findings are based on composite indices. More 
research should be conducted to understand how COVID-19 affects 
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